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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter comes on before this court on appeal from an 
order entered on May 1, 1998, partially dismissing this 
action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim on which relief can be granted. 1 See Doug 
Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 3 F. Supp.2d 518 
(D.N.J. 1998). The appellants had instituted this action in 
the Superior Court of New Jersey but the appellees r emoved 
it to the district court. Consequently, when the district 
court entered the Rule 12(b)(6) order it r emanded 
appellants' state-law claims that it did not addr ess to the 
Superior Court. In view of the procedural posture of this 
case, we treat the allegations of fact in the complaint as 
true, and consider them in a light most favorable to the 
appellants.2 
 
The individual appellants are blackjack players who have 
frequented Atlantic City casinos operated by the casino 
appellees. Of the 60 individual appellants, all but six have 
developed card-counting skills for playing blackjack 
enabling them to reduce or eliminate the nor mal odds in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In our extensive Introduction and at other places in our opinion, we 
essentially have tracked the district court's compr ehensive opinion. We 
also note that the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Campione v. Adamar 
of N. J., Inc., 714 A.2d 299, 301, 305-06 (N.J. 1998), discussed the 
countermeasures the New Jersey Casino Control Commission has 
allowed the casinos to take against card-counters. Of course, the 
casinos' use of these countermeasures is at the heart of this case. 
 
2. Inasmuch as the complaint references and relies on the content of 
certain documents, we consider them on this appeal. See Churchill v. 
Star Enter., 183 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999); Rose v. Bartle, 871 
F.2d 331, 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989). Indeed, this case is unusual as the 
appendix consists of four volumes and thus is of a length which might 
be expected on an appeal from a summary judgment rather than on 
appeal from a motion to dismiss. 
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favor of the casinos and, indeed, to turn the odds in their 
favor. The corporate appellants are associated with 
appellant Doug Grant, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, 
whose predecessor corporations operated car d-counting 
schools and mock casinos established by the appellant, 
Doug Grant, a renowned card-counter . Doug Grant, Inc. 
also provided the training for several cooperative player 
groups, including many of the appellants her e, who pooled 
their financial resources and agr eed to share their 
blackjack winnings. 
 
A. The Play of Blackjack, Card-Counting and Shuffling- 
       At-Will and Other Countermeasur es 
 
The gravamen of appellants' complaint is that the casinos 
have taken countermeasures that the appellants regard as 
illegal to eliminate the advantage that a skilled card- 
counter may have over them in playing blackjack, the one 
casino game in which a player's skill may incr ease his 
chance of winning to the point of eliminating the winning 
odds in favor of the "house." See Campione v. Adamar of N. 
J., Inc., 714 A.2d 299, 301 (N.J. 1998). Car d-counters use 
intellect and memory to identify the time during the course 
of play when a player's odds of winning are better or worse. 
Thus, the individual appellants allege that the casinos have 
impaired their ability to win money from the casinos in 
blackjack. The corporate appellants allege that their schools 
and mock casinos were forced to close as a result of the 
casinos' countermeasures against car d-counters, and 
because of bomb threats, break-ins, destruction of 
property, theft of student lists, stalking and other 
intimidation tactics. 
 
It is necessary for us partially to describe how blackjack 
games are run in order to put appellants' allegations in 
context. Blackjack is played with decks containing 52 cards 
of four suits (hearts, diamonds, clubs and spades) with 
each suit containing 13 cards (Ace, King, Queen, Jack, 10, 
9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2). See N.J.A.C. S 19:46-1.17. Before a 
blackjack game starts, the dealer receives one or more, 
usually between six to eight, card decks fr om a casino 
supervisor and inspects them in the presence of the 
floorperson. See id. S 19:47-2.4(a). After inspecting the 
cards, the dealer takes them to a blackjack table and 
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spreads them out in a fan, face upward, for visual 
inspection by the first player or players to arrive at the 
table. See id. S 19:47-2.4(b). After these players are afforded 
an opportunity to inspect the cards, the dealer turns them 
face downward on the table, mixes them thor oughly, and 
shuffles them until they are "randomly intermixed." The 
dealer then places the cards into a stack. See id. S 19:47- 
2.4(c); id. S 19:47-2.5(a). After the shuffling is completed, 
the dealer asks the player seated at a particular position at 
the table, as defined by the regulations of the Casino 
Control Commission ("CCC"), the casino r egulatory agency, 
id. 19:47-2.5(e), to cut the deck. See id.  S 19:47-2.5(b). The 
player cuts the deck by placing a plastic cutting card in the 
stack at least ten cards from either end. See id. S 19:47- 
2.5(c). 
 
Once the player has inserted the cutting car d, the dealer 
takes all the cards in front of the cutting card and places 
them at the back of the stack. See id. S 19:47-2.5(d). The 
dealer then takes the entire stack of shuffled cards and 
cuts and aligns it along the side of the dealing shoe which 
has a mark on its side enabling the dealer to insert the 
cutting card so that it is in a position "at least 
approximately" one-quarter of the way fr om the back of the 
stack. See id. S 19:47-2.5(d); id.  S 19:46-1.19(d)(4). The 
dealer then inserts the stack of cards into the dealing shoe 
for commencement of play. See id. S 19:47-2.5(d). The cards 
behind the cutting card will not be used during the game. 
 
Once play has commenced the dealer deals the car ds to 
the players in a series of hands until the dealer r eaches the 
cutting card. When the dealer reaches the cutting card, the 
dealer repeats the shuffling process and cutting procedures 
described above. See id. S 19:47-2.5(h). 
 
A blackjack player's object is to reach as close as possible 
to a total card value of 21 without exceeding that value. A 
player exceeding 21 loses regardless of the dealer's 
subsequently acquired hand. Persons in the casino 
industry and card-counters have come to r ecognize that, in 
a player's endeavor to reach a value as close as possible to 
21, certain cards are more favorable to the player and 
certain cards are more favorable to the dealer. In particular, 
appellants assert that the Ace, King, Queen, Jack and Ten 
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are favorable to a player, but the 6, 5, 4, 3, and 2 are 
favorable to the dealer and thus to the house. The 7, 8, and 
9 are said to be neutral. At any point during the play, the 
cards in a shoe can contain more player -favorable cards or 
more dealer-favorable cards. When there are more player- 
favorable cards, a player's chances of winning are increased 
but when there are more dealer -favorable cards, the 
dealer's chances of winning are increased. Whether and 
when a shoe will turn out to be player - or dealer-favorable 
is purely random. 
 
Card-counters attempt to "count cards" to determine 
whether and when a shoe is player-favorable. They then 
vary their bets, i.e., betting high when the shoe is player- 
favorable and low when the shoe is dealer-favorable to 
increase their chances of having a winning r ound of play. 
Bets are placed before each individual r ound of blackjack, 
usually within established minimum and maximum limits 
for the table. According to the appellants, successful card- 
counting contains several basic elements including the 
assignment of a point value to each card, maintaining a 
running total of those points during play, betting strategies, 
playing strategies, money management, a sufficient 
bankroll, and "the intangible ability to consistently apply 
these interrelated strategies under fast-paced casino 
conditions." See app. at 24. 
 
For maximum advantage, card-counters need to be able 
to view, through the rounds of play, as many of the cards 
in the shoe as possible. The greater number of cards they 
are able to view, the easier it is for them to determine to 
whom the remaining cards in the shoe ar e favorable. For 
this reason, card-counters prefer that the dealer place the 
cutting card toward the end of the shoe, leaving a small 
number of cards behind the cutting-card and increasing 
the overall number of cards in play. Car d-counters also 
prefer to have the entire shoe of car ds played. If the dealer 
reshuffles prior to reaching the cutting card, then the card- 
counters' opportunity to bet high on a shoe with a 
remainder of mostly player-favorable car ds is impaired. 
 
The casinos, on the other hand, prefer to decr ease the 
card-counters' opportunity to bet high on a player-favorable 
shoe. Therefore, it is in their inter est to decrease the card- 
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counters' chances of determining whether a shoe is player- 
favorable by playing with fewer cards in the shoe, i.e., 
placing the cutting card as far from the back of the stack 
as permitted by the CCC regulations. It is also in the 
casinos' interest to reshuffle prior to reaching the cutting 
card when the remaining cards in a shoe are player- 
favorable. These practices, however, come at a cost to the 
casino as the more often the dealer goes thr ough the 
meticulous shuffling process, the shorter the actual time of 
play and thus the smaller the casino's profits. 
 
Appellants allege that the casinos maintain car d-counting 
teams and/or video and computer surveillance equipment 
to identify card-counters and inform the dealers of their 
participation in a blackjack game so that the dealers can 
take countermeasures against them. Appellants challenge 
these practices, claiming they violate the New Jersey 
"cheating games" section in the Casino Contr ol Act, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 5:12-115 (West 1996), which provides that it 
shall be unlawful: 
 
       Knowingly to deal, conduct, carry on, operate or expose 
       for play any game or games played with cards . . . 
       which have in any manner been marked or tamper ed 
       with, or placed in a condition, or operated in a manner, 
       the result of which tends to deceive the public or tends 
       to alter the normal random selection of characteristics 
       or the normal chance of the game which could 
       determine or alter the result of the game. 
 
The appellants make several specific allegations to 
support their claims. See Doug Grant, 3 F . Supp.2d at 524- 
25. First, they argue that the card-counter identifying 
process fundamentally is flawed because it tends unfairly to 
misidentify non-card-counters as card-counters. They claim 
casinos define card-counters as (1) any patr on who 
increases a bet during a player-favorable count, or (2) any 
patron who knows or is related to someone who has 
increased a bet during a player-favorable count. According 
to appellants, a player the casino identifies as a card- 
counter is "branded for life" and never is able to play a 
"fair" game of blackjack without being subjected to 
countermeasures. The casinos allegedly share information 
about suspected card-counters through defendant Griffin 
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Investigations and other similar agencies. These agencies 
allegedly keep dossiers containing the pictur es of suspected 
card-counters which casino employees then use to spot 
card-counters for the purpose of knowing when to 
implement countermeasures. 
 
Second, appellants claim that the casinos utilize what 
they term the "cheating-at-will" pr eferential shuffle and 
which, as codified by the CCC regulations, generally is 
known as the "shuffle-at-will." A dealer r eshuffling prior to 
reaching the cut-card marker shuffles-at-will. A casino will 
shuffle in this manner when its card-counting team 
determines that the shoe is player-favorable at a table 
where it suspects card-counters ar e playing. Appellants 
allege that the shuffle-at-will provides an extra 2% 
advantage to the casino, nearly double its nor mal chance of 
winning, and thus providing the casinos with a windfall of 
millions of dollars. Id. at 525. They also claim that a casino 
can shuffle-at-will abusively to the disadvantage of players 
who are not card-counters by shuffling-at-will even when 
its employees do not suspect that there is a card-counter 
playing at a table. Id. 
 
Appellants recount specific instances in which individual 
appellants allegedly were subjected to shuffling-at-will by 
specific casinos throughout the past ten years. On some, 
but not all, of these occasions, the player r eported the 
shuffle-at-will to the CCC and/or the New Jersey 
Department of Gaming Enforcement ("DGE") official on-site 
at every casino. According to appellants, the casinos never 
have responded to such complaints by admitting to 
counting cards and shuffling during a player -favorable 
count. Id. 
 
Appellants also allege that because they have been 
identified as card-counters, they are limited to one wager at 
a time, are refused cards, have bets pushed back, and are 
forced to bet below the original posted limit at the table. Id. 
Moreover, they allege that "shills" associated with the 
casinos sometimes occupy all seats at tables at which they 
wish to play. Id. The appellants allege that they have been 
treated in these adverse ways even though players who are 
not card-counters are not so treated. 
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Appellants also claim that the casinos have denied them 
hospitality "comps," such as meals, after identifying them 
as card-counters. Id. Finally, appellants allege that they 
have been threatened, assaulted and stalked because of 
their suspected card-counter status. Id.  They allege that 
they have been threatened in person while at the casinos 
by both known and unknown casino employees and that 
they have been threatened and sent pornographic materials 
over the Internet by unnamed John Does allegedly 
connected to the casinos. Id. 
 
B. The Casino Control Act and CCC Regulations 
 
The New Jersey Casino Control Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 5:12-1 et seq. (West 1996) (the "Act"), gives the CCC 
comprehensive authority to define and r egulate the rules 
and conduct of play for blackjack and other authorized 
casino games. See Campione, 714 A.2d at 304; Uston v. 
Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 372-73 (N.J. 1982). 
It also grants the CCC "exclusive jurisdiction" over the 
interpretation and enforcement of r egulations governing "all 
matters delegated to it or within the scope of its powers 
under the provisions of [the Act]." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12- 
133b; see also id. 5:12-69, 70. That jurisdiction delegates 
to the CCC the power to promulgate regulations regarding 
the rules of casino games, including blackjack, id. SS 5:12- 
69-70f, gambling related advertising, id.  S 5:12-70o, and the 
enforcement of gaming regulations, including the 
investigation, adjudication, and punishment of r egulatory 
violations, id. SS 5:12-63b, f, g;id. S 5:12-64; id. S 5:12-129. 
 
The regulations governing blackjack ar e exhaustive and 
set forth in great detail the rules for the conduct of the 
game. See N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.1 et seq. Indeed, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court has stated that, "[i]t is no 
exaggeration to state that the Commission's r egulation of 
blackjack is more extensive than the entir e administrative 
regulation of many industries." Uston , 445 A.2d 373. The 
CCC is very aware of the card-counter controversy. As the 
parties have recognized, the CCC carefully has considered 
and addressed in its regulatory capacity the effect card- 
counters can have on the game and the ways in which 
casinos should be permitted to respond to professional 
card-counters. See, e.g., 14 N.J. Reg. 467-70 (May 17, 
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1982); 14 N.J. Reg. 559-69 (June 7, 1982); 14 N.J. Reg. 
841 (Aug. 2, 1982); 23 N.J. Reg. 1784 (June 3, 1991); 23 
N.J. Reg. 2613 (Sept. 3, 1991); 23 N.J. Reg. 3350 (Nov. 4, 
1991); 23 N.J. Reg. 3354 (Nov. 4, 1991); 25 N.J. Reg. 3953 
(Sept. 7, 1993); 25 N.J. Reg. 5521 (Dec. 6, 1993). The CCC 
regulations authorize the casinos to use certain 
countermeasures to prevent car d-counters from overcoming 
the statistical advantage that is necessary to ensur e the 
casinos' financial viability. 
 
The CCC adopted many of its regulations authorizing 
countermeasures in response to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court's ruling in Uston, 445 A.2d 370, a case considering 
whether casinos have the authority to exclude car d- 
counters from their premises. The court determined that 
casinos were not authorized to exclude car d-counters, 
reasoning that the Act gave the CCC exclusive and plenary 
authority to set the rules and methods of play of casino 
games and that the CCC had not authorized the exclusion 
of card-counters as a countermeasur e.3 The court 
suggested, however, that if the CCC wanted to approve 
measures to neutralize the card-counter threat, it might be 
able to exclude card-counters, provided that the regulation 
did not violate constitutional or statutory limits. Uston, 445 
A.2d at 375-76. 
 
Yet, prior to Uston, the CCC had codified a practice which 
the casinos used as a card-counter counter measure even 
though the CCC did not promulgate it for that purpose. 
This regulation provides that: "[a] casino licensee, in its 
discretion" may permit a player to"wager on [more than] 
one box at a Blackjack table." N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.14. The 
CCC had been allowing the use of this practice against 
card-counters through its approval of casinos' internal 
control pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-99. The rule 
specifically grants casinos discretion to allow players 
(usually non-card-counters) to bet on mor e than one box, 
and presumably, in light of the discretionary language, 
allows them to preclude card-counters fr om betting on 
more than one box. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It appears that prior to Uston the casinos on at least some occasions 
excluded card-counters and did so with "overwhelming force." See State 
v. Sanders, 448 A.2d 481, 485 (N.J. Super . Ct. App. Div. 1982). 
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After Uston, the CCC held a series of hearings on the 
issue of card-counters and decided to enact r egulations 
authorizing the casinos to use certain measur es to 
neutralize the potential negative effect car d-counters could 
have on their financial viability. See Campione, 714 A.2d at 
305. The new regulations, which the New Jersey Supreme 
Court urged the CCC to consider in lieu of allowing the 
casinos to exclude card-counters, balanced the statutory 
goals of casino viability and fair odds to all players. See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-100e. The CCC intended the 
regulations to ensure both the fair ness and integrity of 
casino gambling and "the right of the casinos to have the 
rules drawn so as to allow some reasonable pr ofit." Uston, 
445 A.2d at 376; see also 14 N.J. Reg. 560-61 (June 7, 
1982); 23 N.J. Reg. 1784 (June 3, 1991). 
 
Several of these countermeasures involved the manner by 
which casinos could shuffle the blackjack car ds. The first 
approved shuffling method is known as the"Bart Carter 
Shuffle," a "shuffling procedur e in which approximately one 
deck of cards is shuffled after being dealt, segregated into 
separate stacks and each stack is inserted into pr emarked 
locations within the remaining decks contained in the 
dealing shoe." N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.1; see also 14 N.J. Reg. 
559 (June 7, 1982); 14 N.J. Reg. 841 (Aug. 2, 1982). The 
CCC also approved the "shuffle-at-will," which we have 
described above, to allow the casinos to shuffle after any 
round of play. To implement this appr oval, the CCC 
amended the existing shuffle regulation by adding language 
regarding the casinos' authority to shuffle "after each round 
of play": 
 
        (a) Immediately prior to commencement of play, after 
       any round of play as may be determined by the casino 
       licensee and after each shoe of cards is dealt, the 
       dealer shall shuffle the cards so that they are randomly 
       intermixed. 
 
       . . . 
 
        (h) A reshuffle of the cards in the shoe shall take 
       place after the cutting card is reached in the shoe . . . 
       except that: 
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        1. The casino licensee may determine aft er each 
       round of play that the cards should be r eshuffled; 
 
        2. When the `Bart Carter Shuffle' is util ized a 
       reshuffle shall take place after the car ds in the discard 
       rack exceed approximately one deck in number . 
 
N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.5; see 14 N.J. Reg. 559 (June 7, 1982), 
14 N.J. Reg. 841 (Aug. 2, 1982). 
 
The CCC also has approved the use of a device known as 
the continuous shuffling shoe. In place of the dealing and 
shuffling requirements set forth in N.J.A.C. 19:47-2.5 and 
2.6, a casino licensee may utilize a dealing shoe or other 
device designed to reshuffle the cards automatically, 
provided that the CCC or its authorized designatee has 
approved such shoe or device and the pr ocedures for 
dealing and shuffling the cards through the use of this 
device. See N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.21; see also 14 N.J. Reg. 559 
(June 7, 1982), 14 N.J. Reg. 841 (Aug. 2, 1982). 
 
The shuffling regulations, particularly the most 
commonly used shuffle-at-will, have enabled the casinos to 
lessen the card-counters' ability to deter mine whether cards 
remaining in the shoe are player-favorable. As we already 
have noted, when the cards are reshuffled continuously or 
prior to the dealer reaching the cutting-car d in the shoe, 
card-counters lose their potential advantage over the 
casinos because they no longer can increase their bets, 
secure in the knowledge that their chance of r eceiving 
player-favorable cards has been incr eased. 
 
The CCC also authorized one non-shuffling 
countermeasure after the Uston decision--an increase in 
the number of decks casinos are allowed to use in 
blackjack play. See N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.2. This change 
helped the casinos combat card-counters by incr easing the 
number of cards card-counters would need to track to 
determine whether a shoe was player-favorable. Plainly, the 
more cards in the shoe, the more difficult a player's task is 
to keep track of the cards. 
 
After the CCC authorized these initial counter measures, 
in 1991 it approved another regulation which provides that: 
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        [A] casino licensee may at any time change the 
       permissible minimum or maximum wager at a table 
       game, without notifying the Commission of such 
       change, upon posting a sign at the gaming table 
       advising patrons of the new permissible minimum or 
       maximum wager and announcing the change to 
       patrons who are at the table. 
 
N.J.A.C. S 19:47-8.3(c); see also 23 N.J. Reg. 1784 (June 3, 
1991); 23 N.J. Reg. 2613 (Sept. 3, 1991); 23 N.J. Reg. 3350 
(Nov. 4, 1991); 23 N.J. Reg. 3354 (Nov. 4, 1991). This 
regulation gives the casinos the authority to lower the 
betting limit whenever it identifies a car d-counter so that 
the card-counter will not be able to bet high when the shoe 
becomes player-favorable. Then, in 1993, the CCC made a 
further addition to its regulations which, as further 
amended in 1999, provides: 
 
       (b) A casino licensee may offer: 
 
       1. Different maximum wagers at one gaming table for 
       each permissible wager in an authorized game; and 
 
       2. Different maximum wagers at dif ferent gaming 
       tables for each permissible wager in an authorized 
       game. 
 
       (c) A casino licensee shall provide notice of the 
       minimum and maximum wagers in effect at each 
       gaming table, and any changes thereto, in accor dance 
       with N.J.A.C. 19:47-8.3. 
 
       (d) Notwithstanding (c) above, a casino licensee may, in 
       its discretion, permit a player to wager below the 
       established minimum wager or above the established 
       maximum wager at a gaming table. 
 
       (e) Any wager accepted by a dealer which is in excess 
       of the established maximum permitted wager at that 
       gaming table shall be paid or lost in its entir ety in 
       accordance with the rules of the game, notwithstanding 
       that the wager exceeded the current table maximum or 
       was lower than the current table maximum. 
 
N.J.A.C. 19:47-8.2(b) to (e); see 25 N.J. Reg. 3953 (Sept. 7, 
1993); 25 N.J. Reg. 5521 (Dec. 6, 1993). This r egulation 
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clarified that the casinos could limit specifically the wagers 
of only those patrons identified as car d-counters, while 
permitting non-card-counters to continue betting at higher 
limits. 
 
The New Jersey courts seem not to doubt the legality of 
the CCC-authorized countermeasures. In particular, the 
trial court in Campione recognized that the practice of 
"shuffling at will," the central concer n in this case identified 
by the district court, is authorized by CCC r egulation, see 
N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.5, and affects all patrons, even those not 
counting cards, at a blackjack table. See Campione v. 
Adamar of N. J., Inc., 643 A.2d 42, 50-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1993), rev'd on other gr ounds, 694 A.2d 1045 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), mod. and af f 'd, 714 A.2d 299 
(N.J. 1998). Further, on appeal in Campione, the New 
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, found that the 
CCC "authorizes the disparate treatment of card-counters." 
694 A.2d at 1050. The court noted that the CCC has 
approved the countermeasures allowing for betting limits 
and permitting casinos to vary the number of boxes in 
which particular players can wager. Id.  at 1047. Finally, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Campione, while not 
expressly upholding the countermeasur es the CCC has 
allowed, implicitly made it clear the CCC lawfully may 




The complaint in this action alleged violations of the 
United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. S 1983, and the 
federal RICO statute, as well as causes of action under the 
New Jersey RICO statute, constitution and common law. 
Thus, the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1441, 1331, and 1367. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Our review of a district court's order of dismissal of a 
complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failur e to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted, is plenary and we 
apply the same test as the district court. See Maio v. Aetna, 
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Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, "[a] motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted only if, 
accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as 
true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Id. at 481-82. 
However, while our standard of r eview requires us to accept 
as true all factual allegations in the complaint,"we need 
not accept as true `unsupported conclusions and 
unwarranted inferences.' " City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn 
Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 n.13 (3d Cir . 1998) (quoting 
Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light 
Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997)). "[C]ourts have an 
obligation in matters before them to view the complaint as 
a whole and to base rulings not upon the presence of mere 
words but, rather, upon the presence of a factual situation 
which is or is not justiciable. We do draw on the allegations 
of the complaint, but in a realistic, rather than a slavish, 




A. RICO Claims 
 
Appellants' first count alleges claims for racketeering 
under federal RICO, 18 U.S.C. S 1964(c), New Jersey RICO, 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:41-4c (West 1995), and the RICO 
provisions of the Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-127c (West 
1996). As appellees point out, the predicate acts of alleged 
racketeering on which appellants' base their RICO claims 
consist almost exclusively of the use of counter measures or 
alleged violations of other CCC regulations. In order to 
make out a RICO claim, appellants first must show that the 
casinos committed the predicate criminal acts enumerated 
by RICO. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. SS 1961, 1962. Appellants 
claim that the casinos committed the following pr edicate 
acts: shuffling-at-will when the count was player -favorable, 
using computer and video technology to assist in counting 
cards and identifying card-counters, denying comps to 
appellants, using shills, limiting plaintiffs to one hand of 
blackjack at a time, lowering betting limits, and failing to 
disclose the use and nature of the disputed 
countermeasures. See br. 30-41; Doug Grant, 3 F. Supp.2d 
at 531-32. Based on the premise that these uses of 
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authorized countermeasures and other alleged regulatory 
violations are criminal acts, appellants' complaint alleges 
that the casinos' operation of blackjack violates criminal 
statutes regarding unlawful debt collection, transmission of 
gambling information, operation of illegal gambling 
business, and interstate commerce for an unlawful activity. 
 
The district court believed that the primary purported 
predicate act on which appellants relied is the shuffling of 
cards when the count is favorable to the players.4 The 
complaint alleges that use of the "shuffling-at-will" 
countermeasure constitutes a predicate act of racketeering 
because it violates the criminal casino "cheating" statute, 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-115. The trial court in Campione 
rejected this precise claim. Campione , 643 A.2d at 51 
("labeling of the shuffling at will as `cheating' is specious"). 
Moreover, despite appellants' pr otestations, the regulation 
itself makes clear that a casino at its discr etion may shuffle 
at the conclusion of any round of play: 
 
       (a) Immediately prior to commencement of play, after 
       any round of play as may be determined by the casino 
       licensee and after each shoe of cards is dealt, the 
       dealer shall shuffle the cards so that they are randomly 
       intermixed. 
 
       . . . 
 
       (h) A reshuffle of the cards in the shoe shall take place 
       after the cutting card is reached in the shoe as 
       provided in N.J.A.C. 19:47-2.6(1) except that: 
 
        1. The casino licensee may determine after each 
       round of play that the cards shall be r eshuffled. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In their brief, the appellants contend that the district court was 
incorrect in this characterization, as their"central concern is the 
deceptive, unadvertised and clandestine use of countermeasures only 
when the cards favor players." See br. at 31. We will not linger on this 
point for two reasons. First, the casinos take their countermeasures 
quite openly. For example, it should be appar ent to anyone at a table 
when the dealer shuffles before the cutting card is reached. Second, it 
seems clear that, as the district court recognized, the principal 
countermeasure is shuffling-at-will. 
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N.J.A.C. S 19:47-2.5(a), (h). 
 
Appellants attempt at length to skew the plain meaning 
of this regulation and the relevant r egulatory history 
leading to its adoption to convince us that the CCC has 
authorized only a "random shuffle-at-will," i.e., not a 
reshuffle that occurs only during player favorable counts. 
See br. at 33. Appellants' restrictive interpretation of the 
shuffle-at-will regulation, however, runs contrary to its 
express language. 
 
The regulatory history makes clear that the CCC is fully 
aware of and allows the practice of shuffling-at-will when 
there is a player-favorable count as a countermeasure 
against card-counters. When the CCC published the 
proposed regulation to allow the casinos to shuffle-at-will, 
it noted that the casinos might shuffle when the count is 
favorable and that this practice might affect the odds of the 
game: 
 
       The economic impact of this proposed amendment 
       would vary depending on when in fact the car ds were 
       shuffled. For example, if the cards wer e always shuffled 
       after the first round of play regar dless of the point 
       count, then the casino advantage against the basic 
       strategy player and average player would probably 
       remain the same with the advantage enjoyed by the 
       card counter being decreased. If the car ds, however, 
       were only shuffled in positive point count situations 
       and not in negative point count situations, the casino 
       advantage against all types of players would incr ease. 
 
14 N.J. Reg. 470 (May 17, 1982). 
 
Appellants appear to take issue with the propriety of the 
shuffle-at-will regulation. But even assuming that in this 
action we should entertain a challenge to the r egulation, we 
perceive nothing illegal in it.5 In any event, even if the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. There have been numerous state administrative and judicial 
proceedings regarding the issues before us but it is difficult from the 
parties' briefs and appendix to discern their exact status. In any event, 
we do not find any state determination inconsistent with the result we 
reach. Significantly, the parties are in agreement that shortly after 
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regulation is an improper exercise of the CCC's authority, 
a conclusion that we reject, a casino following it before its 
invalidation hardly could be subject to RICO liability for 
that conduct. In our view, a casino does not commit a 
predicate RICO act when it engages in conduct the CCC 
expressly permits. 
 
We are disturbed that appellants have couched their 
arguments in dramatic hyperbole obfuscating the real 
issues. Indeed, we are satisfied that the appellants have 
mischaracterized the facts. For instance, appellants 
characterize the use of the shuffle-at-will as"secretly 
removing cards from a blackjack game in progress." See br. 
at 30. But the reshuffle is hardly secr et as the dealer does 
it openly in the view of the players. Moreover , a dealer 
reshuffling does not remove cards from the deck. Rather, 
the reshuffle simply places the cards in a different random 
order for the next hands. 
 
Appellants further allege that the shuffle-at-will is a RICO 
criminal predicate act because it has a tendency to alter the 
normal random chance of the game. See br. at 32-39. What 
appellants fail to realize, however, is that the normal 
random chance of the game is defined pursuant to the 
statutory rules and CCC regulations. As the CCC has 
explained: 
 
       [T]he normal chance and random character of any 
       casino game is necessarily defined and deter mined by 
       the rules governing the conduct of the game. Since the 
       Commission has the statutory authority to initially 
       establish the rules of the game, N.J.S.A. S 5:12-100e 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
appellants filed this action, the individual appellants "filed a petition 
with the CCC with claims identical to those raised in the federal 
complaint." See appellants' br. at 4; appellees' br. at 5-6. In addition, 
the 
individual appellants later filed a declaratory petition with the CCC 
seeking its "interpretive ruling on pr ovisions of the Act, blackjack 
regulations and casino practices that ar e at issue in this appeal." See 
appellants' br. at 6; appellees' br. at 6. Apparently, appellants were not 
satisfied with the outcome of the declaratory petition, see 31 N.J. Reg. 
555 (Feb. 16, 1999), as they have appealed fr om the determination to the 
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. 
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       and 70f, and primary jurisdiction to resolve any issues 
       concerning interpretation of the Act and the rules 
       promulgated thereunder, . . . it is absurd to allege that 
       practices approved by the Commission as being 
       consistent with its rules constitute `cheating' under 
       section 115 of the Act. 
 
31 N.J. Reg. 556 (Feb. 16, 1999). While appellants may 
wish to have the CCC rethink the scope of the shuffle-at- 
will regulation, we are satisfied that after being stripped of 
its conclusory legal dressing, there is no allegation in the 
complaint regarding reshuffling sufficient to support a 
RICO claim against the casino defendants. 
 
Appellants' other alleged predicate acts ar e similarly 
insufficient to support a RICO claim. The alleged violations 
of criminal statutes regarding unlawful debt collection, 18 
U.S.C. S 1962, transmission of gambling infor mation, 18 
U.S.C. S 1084, interference with commerce by threats or 
violence, 18 U.S.C. S 1951, interstate commer ce for 
unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. S 1952, and operating an illegal 
gambling business, 18 U.S.C. S 1955, all derive from the 
allegations regarding the use of authorized 
countermeasures and other alleged but in fact nonexistent 
violations of the CCC regulations. Any debts allegedly 
"unlawfully collected" are those lost by players during 
blackjack games played in accordance with the CCC 
regulations. Any "illegal gambling business" or "unlawful 
activity in interstate commerce" is simply the play of 
blackjack as authorized by the CCC. Similarly, the casinos 
do not engage "in unlawful activity" or "operating an illegal 
gambling business" by not offering appellants or anyone 
else "comps," which are nothing mor e than free gifts from 
the casinos. While appellants claim that the casinos are 
obliged to offer "comps," in our view if they fail to do so 
they are not committing criminal acts in any way impacting 
on the integrity of the blackjack game. If appellants want to 
bring a judicial action to recover the value of"comps," 
surely their forum should be a New Jersey state court, at 
least in some instances the small claims part. Plainly, the 
casinos' activities of which appellants complain do not 
constitute crimes and therefore ar e not predicate RICO 
acts. 
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Furthermore, appellants, although mentioning the use of 
"shills" in their complaint, have not made any allegations 
that the casinos violate the statutory prohibition of the use 
of "shills," i.e., persons who induce potential patrons to 
enter a casino or induce them to play any game. See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 5:12-1001 (West 1996). Certainly the casinos 
have not used shills to encourage appellants to play 
blackjack in their premises. 
 
In their brief, appellants further assert that the CCC 
stated in an administrative proceeding that it would be 
deceptive for casinos actively to solicit a player to count 
cards in its casino without letting the player know that 
countermeasures will be used against those suspected of 
counting cards. See br. at 11, 25. Appellants, however, fail 
to cite the full text of the CCC's statement, which 
concluded: 
 
       [T]he Commission does not believe that any of the 
       exhibits submitted by the commenters come even close 
       to supporting an allegation of active solicitation of card 
       counter play by a casino licensee. 
 
31 N.J. Reg. 556 (Feb. 6, 1999). Thus, appellants' r eference 
to the CCC's statement adds nothing to their allegation that 
the casinos' use of shills constitutes a RICO act. 
 
Appellants also assert that it is deceptive for the casinos 
to fail to provide players with a complete text of the rules 
governing the play of blackjack. This allegation also fails to 
support a claim for relief. As we set forth above, the rules 
and regulations governing blackjack ar e numerous and 
thus they do not lend themselves to inclusion in a short 
manual. Further, the sample casino br ochure in the 
appendix explaining blackjack on its face is not deceptive. 
See app. at 832-34. While it does not purport to set forth 
all of the blackjack rules, it does give the infor mation 
needed by a player to play the game. 
 
The appellants also allege that it is impermissible for the 
casinos to require one player's wager to be less than that of 
other players at the same table. See br . at 40 (citing N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 5:12-100g (West 1996)). As we mentioned, 
however, the CCC has adopted a regulation that specifically 
allows casinos to set different wager limits, even among 
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players at the same table, if a player is suspected of card 
counting. See N.J.A.C. S 19:47-8.2(b)-(d). As a result, the 
casinos cannot be said to have violated the Act in a manner 
to support a RICO cause of action. While appellants may 
wish to challenge the propriety of the r egulation, they have 
not stated a RICO cause of action against the casinos 
whose actions are in compliance with the law and the 
CCC's regulations. 
 
Appellants next argue that the casinos' failur e to obtain 
prior approval for the countermeasur es they implement 
constitutes a predicate act. See br . at 40-41. Yet appellants 
also recognize that the CCC has determined that the 
casinos do not need prior approval to implement the 
measures. See id. at 41. While the appellants note that that 
ruling is being challenged on appeal, it will be time enough 
for a federal court to consider the RICO implications if and 
when the CCC determines that the casinos' practices are 
illegal and the casinos do not comply prospectively with the 
CCC's determinations. 
 
The only alleged predicate acts that ar e not based on 
CCC regulations are the allegations of assaults, threats, 
and stalking-in-person and via the Internet. Appellants 
allege that one appellant was knocked off his seat on one 
occasion, that some appellants were followed ar ound 
casinos, and that one appellant was grabbed by the arm 
while being escorted out of a casino. However , these minor 
altercations cannot be regarded as conduct egregious 
enough to serve as predicate acts sufficient to support what 
appellants apparently believe is massive litigation, in which, 
before trebling, they are seeking at least $347,532,800 in 
damages. See Doug Grant, 3 F. Supp.2d at 522 n.1. Nor do 
the appellants' claims of receiving anonymous 
pornographic, offensive and threatening messages over the 
Internet from John Doe defendants constitute predicate 
acts attributable to the appellees, as appellants put forth 
no basis for concluding or even alleging that anyone 
associated with the casinos sent the messages. Accor dingly, 
we will affirm the order of the district court dismissing the 
state and federal RICO causes of action. 
 
For the reasons we have set forth, we have r eached the 
conclusion that appellants' allegations that the casinos or 
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any appellee has committed predicate RICO acts are 
completely insubstantial and border on the frivolous. In the 
circumstances, inasmuch as appellants have failed to allege 
any predicate act upon which to base a RICO claim, we 
need not determine conclusively whether appellants 
properly have pleaded injury to business or pr operty as 
required for a RICO damages action. See 18 U.S.C. 
S 1964(c); N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2C:41-4c (W est 1995); Maio, 221 
F.3d at 483-84. Nevertheless, in this r egard we do make the 
following observation which demonstrates why this action, 
which has generated a large recor d and required a 
considerable expenditure of time and no doubt money is, at 
bottom, at least with respect to the claims we have 
considered, a fatuity. 
 
Unlike an ordinary RICO victim, in this case the allegedly 
injured plaintiffs, i.e., the players, can avoid any injury 
simply by walking away from the alleged wr ongdoers, the 
casinos, by not playing blackjack in casinos. In fact, that is 
what the casinos apparently want them to do, at least as 
long as they count cards. While this abstention would 
deprive them of the opportunity to enrich themselves at the 
casinos' expense, surely it would be difficult to characterize 
that lost speculative opportunity as an injury to"business 
or property." If the appellants have played blackjack in the 
past, aware of the casinos' countermeasur es, and if they 
continue to play blackjack in the future in the hope of 
profiting by counting cards, they have suffered and will 
suffer self-inflicted wounds. Accordingly, at least with 
respect to individual players who are awar e of the casinos' 
countermeasures, it is difficult to consider this case within 
a RICO formulation.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In their brief, the casinos assert as an alter native ground for 
affirmance that the statute of limitations has run as to some of the 
appellants' claims. See br. at 14 & n.5. Appellants respond that they 
have alleged continuing violations that render their claims timely. See 
reply br. at 9. Appellants seem to overlook, however, that the corporate 
plaintiffs all ceased operations by 1992. See app. at 930-32. In the 
circumstances, inasmuch as appellants instituted this action in 1997, 
the corporate appellants' federal RICO claims ar e barred by the four-year 
RICO statute of limitations. See Forbes v. Eagleson, No. 99-1803, ___ 
F.3d. ___, 2000 WL 1529852, at *10 (3d Cir. Oct. 17, 2000). 
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B. Leave to Amend 
 
The appellants originally pleaded a cause of action under 
the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, but omitted that 
claim in their amended complaint. In the district court, and 
here, they have asked permission to amend their complaint 
to reinclude the Consumer Fraud Act claim. The district 
court denied appellants leave to amend because it found 
that the Consumer Fraud Act claim was completely without 
merit and it would be futile to amend the complaint to 
include a meritless claim. See Doug Grant, 3 F. Supp.2d at 
536-37. 
 
As noted by the district court, the New Jersey Supr eme 
Court recently has held that the Consumer Fraud Act does 
not apply to a heavily regulated industry to the extent that 
application of the statute would create a "r eal possibility" of 
conflict between the Consumer Fraud Act, as administered 
by the Division of Consumer Affairs, and the r egulatory 
schemes of other administrative bodies. See Lemelledo v. 
Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 696 A.2d 546, 553 (N.J. 
1997). Thus, the Consumer Fraud Act is inapplicable where 
"the other source or sources of r egulation deal specifically, 
concretely, and pervasively with the particular activity, 
implying a legislative intent not to subject parties to 
multiple regulations that, as applied, will work at cross- 
purposes." Id. at 554. 
 
Certainly the Casino Control Act evidences the New 
Jersey legislature's intent to vest in the CCC exclusive 
control of the regulation of casino gaming, including the 
content of related advertising. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12- 
133b (West 1996); id. S 5:12-70(o); see also Greate Bay 
Hotel & Casino v. Tose, 34 F.3d 1227, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 
1994). If we allowed claims such as the appellants' 
proposed consumer fraud claim to proceed in the district 
court, we would interfere with the CCC's regulatory 
scheme. The regulation of the game of blackjack, including 
shuffling-at-will and the advertisement regulations, is 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CCC. Mor eover, the 
CCC has particularized expertise in these matters not 
possessed by courts and juries. While it is true that the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey in Campione, approving our 
opinion in Tose, see 714 A.2d at 307-08, held that the 
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courts were not ousted of jurisdiction over common law 
damage claims against casinos merely because the claims 
arose from gambling transactions, this holding does not 
inform our result here on the very different question of the 
applicability of a different regulatory act to casino 
operations with respect to running blackjack games. Thus, 
the district court properly denied appellants' motion for 
leave to amend for, as a matter of law, the amended 
complaint would not have stated a claim on which r elief 
could be granted. See Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n, 139 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 1999), vacated on other 
grounds, 525 U.S. 459, 119 S.Ct. 924 (1999). 
 
In reaching our result on this point, we emphasize that 
the goals of the Consumer Fraud and the Casino Contr ol 
Acts are not entirely consistent. The Consumer Fraud Act 
is concerned with the protection of consumers. The Casino 
Control Act, however, has dual purposes that must be 
balanced -- the protection of gambling patr ons and the 
protection of the financial viability of the casino industry. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12-1b (12) (West 1996). Thus, the Casino 
Control Act presupposes that the consumers as a group, 
i.e., the players, will lose their money, a contemplated 
result that hardly is the object of the Consumer Fraud Act. 
 
C. Dismissal Against John Does with Prejudice 
 
The sixth count of the complaint alleges various state 
and federal statutory claims against John Does for sending 
offensive messages and alleged threats over the Internet. 
But while the appellants in the complaint sought r elief 
against the casino appellees for these acts, see  app. at 104, 
they failed to offer any link between the John Does and the 
casinos. Thus, the district court properly dismissed this 
aspect of the complaint, though it did so with pr ejudice. We 
conclude, however, that the dismissal should have been 
without prejudice, allowing appellants to bring a claim at a 
later time if they uncover sufficient facts to per mit them to 
plead facts supporting a conclusion that the casinos were 
responsible for these acts. Accordingly, we will vacate the 
order dismissing the sixth count with pr ejudice to the 
extent that it included claims relating to the sending of the 
offensive messages and threats over the Internet, and with 
respect to that aspect of the order will r emand the matter 
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to the district court to modify the order so that it dismisses 
the count without prejudice. 
 
D. Constitutional and Civil Rights Claims 
 
Appellants' sixth count also alleges violations of the 
Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, Article 1, 
paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. As the district court correctly noted, this count fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for several 
reasons. First, appellants' allegations of state action are 
insufficient. State regulation and the CCC's authorization of 
casino activities do not transform the casinos into state 
actors. See Uston v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 448 F. Supp. 116, 
118 (D. Nev. 1978); State v. Sanders, 448 A.2d 481, 486 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (sear ch by casino 
employees does not constitute state action). It is well 
established that "[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the 
initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify 
holding the State responsible for those initiatives under the 
terms of the Fourteenth Amendment." Blum v. Yaretsky, 
457 U.S. 991, 1004-05, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 2786 (1982); 
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51, 
95 S.Ct. 449, 453-54 (1974). Second, appellants have not 
suffered any equal protection clause violation inasmuch as 
under the rational basis test applicable for a non-protected 
class such as card-counters subject to CCC r egulations, 
see Bally Mfg. Corp. v. New Jersey Casino Contr ol Comm'n, 
426 A.2d 1000, 1005 (N.J.) (casino regulations examined 
under rational basis test), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 804, 
102 S.Ct. 77 (1981), the countermeasur es used by the 
casinos and authorized by the CCC are rationally related to 
the legitimate state interest in protecting the financial 
viability of the casino industry. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 5:12- 
1b(12). Third, we are satisfied that the appellants do not 
have a constitutionally protected property interest in the 
opportunity to gamble and thus the activities of which they 
complain do not violate their due process rights. Therefore, 
the district court properly dismissed the constitutional and 
civil rights claims in the sixth count of the complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We hasten to add that we do not suggest that our holding means that 
the casinos have carte blanche in dealing with their patrons and they do 
not suggest otherwise. For example, both federal and state 
discrimination laws would be implicated if casinos discriminated among 
their patrons on the basis of their inclusion in protected groups. 
 




We have carefully considered all of appellants' 
arguments, including those that we may not have 
addressed specifically, and have concluded that the district 
court properly dismissed this action with pr ejudice with 
respect to the counts of the complaint that it addressed, 
except that it should have dismissed count six without 
prejudice to the extent that the count r elated to sending 
offensive messages and threats over the Internet.8 
Consequently, we will modify the order of dismissal to 
provide that count six partially is dismissed without 
prejudice, and we otherwise will affir m the order of 
dismissal with prejudice, and will affir m the order 
remanding the remaining aspects of the complaint to the 
Superior Court of New Jersey. We will r emand the case to 
the district court to enter an order consistent with this 
opinion. Costs on this appeal will be taxed against 
appellants. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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8. Immediately before oral argument on this appeal, appellants filed a 
motion requesting "an evidentiary hearing on possible conflicts of 
interest of the district court" because of what appellants said were their 
"serious concerns" that the court "may have undisclosed conflicts of 
interest or financial interests." W e have considered this application 
carefully and will deny the motion as we find it to be without merit. In 
any event, the appellants' "serious concer ns" are quite immaterial, as we 
have exercised plenary review on all the issues on this appeal so that it 
would not matter if the appellants' concerns were justified. While we 
recognize that we review the denial of a motion for leave to amend on an 
abuse of discretion basis, here we ar e upholding the denial on the legal 
basis that the proposed amendment would not survive a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Smith, 139 F.3d at 190. Thus, we have 
not deferred to the district court on any issue on which we have passed. 
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